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monetary policy,Summary
A research network of economists from national central banks of the euro
area and the ECB has been investigating the empirical evidence for inﬂation
persistence, its determinants and implications for monetary policy. This
paper provides an overview of the implications of inﬂation persistence for
the design of monetary policy.
H y b r i dN e w - K e y n e s i a nm o d e l s ,a n da na dh o co b j e c t i v ef u n c t i o nf o rt h e
central bank are commonly used for monetary policy analysis; we there-
fore provide an overview of inﬂation persistence and optimal policy in this
setting. There are two main kinds of micro-foundations for endogenous in-
ﬂation persistence, partial backward-looking indexation and rule-of-thumb
price-setting, and we provide an overview of optimal policy within these
structural models. Using a structural objective function for the central bank
based on the representative agent’s utility within micro-founded models of
inﬂation persistence can alter the results for optimal monetary policy, com-
pared with using an ad hoc objective function for the central bank, and we
therefore also review the case of structural objective functions.
T h ed e g r e eo fe n d o g e n o u si n ﬂation persistence is a key parameter for
assessing the optimality of monetary policies. Given that there is little con-
sensus about the degree of endogenous inﬂation persistence in the empirical
literature, it is of interest to consider optimal monetary policy when the
degree of endogenous inﬂation persistence is uncertain or misspeciﬁed; we
therefore also review results for optimal policy in this case. Some additional
issues relevant for monetary policy design in the presence of inﬂation persis-
tence are also considered, including the implications of imperfect knowledge.
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How monetary policy should be set optimally when the structure of the
economy exhibits inﬂation persistence is an important question for policy
makers. A research network of economists from national central banks of
the euro area and the ECB has been investigating the empirical evidence for
inﬂation persistence, its determinants and implications for monetary policy
(see Angeloni et al. (2004) for a summary). This paper provides an overview
of the implications of inﬂation persistence for the design of monetary policy.
New-Keynesian models, and an ad hoc objective function for the central
bank penalizing inﬂation and output gap volatility, are commonly used for
monetary policy analysis. Section 2 provides an overview of inﬂation persis-
tence and optimal policy for a central bank with an ad hoc objective func-
tion, following Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), and illustrates the results
for optimal policy under discretion and commitment within a hybrid New-
Keynesian model estimated for the euro area by Smets (2003). The degree
of endogenous inﬂation persistence is a key parameter for assessing the opti-
mality of monetary policies. For example, Levin and Williams (2003a) show
that monetary policy rules which are optimal in a forward-looking model can
yield bad outcomes in backward-looking models. Given that there is little
consensus about the degree of endogenous inﬂation persistence in the em-
pirical literature, it is of interest to consider optimal monetary policy when
the degree of endogenous inﬂation persistence is uncertain or misspeciﬁed.
Section 2 therefore also review results for optimal policy when the degree of
endogenous inﬂation persistence is uncertain or misspeciﬁed.
There are two main kinds of micro-foundations for endogenous inﬂation
persistence, partial backward-looking indexation and rule-of-thumb price-
setting (see Gali and Gertler (1999), Woodford (2003), Steinsson (2003),
and Amato and Laubach (2003)). Section 3 gives an overview of optimal
policy within these structural models. Using a structural objective function
for the central bank based on the representative agent’s utility within these
micro-founded models of inﬂation persistence can alter the results for optimal
monetary policy, compared with using an ad hoc objective function for the
central bank. Optimal policy in structural models with micro-founded loss
functions when inﬂation inertia is uncertain or misspeciﬁed is also reviewed
in Section 3.
Results for optimal policy in the presence of backward-looking indexation
of wages as well as of prices in micro-founded models are reviewed in Section
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indexation (see Levin et al. (2005)). Additional issues relevant for monetary
policy design in the presence of inﬂa t i o np e r s i s t e n c ea r ec o n s i d e r e di nS e c t i o n
5, including the implications of heterogeneity in inﬂation persistence between
diﬀerent regions of a currency union, and of imperfect knowledge. Finally,
Section 6 provides a summary.
2 New-Keynesian models and ad hoc objec-
tive functions
2.1 Optimal policy under discretion
This section provides an overview of the implications of endogenous inﬂa-
tion persistence for optimal monetary policy and the associated inﬂation
dynamics, for a central bank with an ad hoc objective function, within hy-
brid New-Keynesian models commonly used for monetary policy analysis,
drawing heavily on Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), where more details can
be found. We illustrate results for inﬂation dynamics under optimal policy
within a hybrid New-Keynesian model estimated for the euro area by Smets
(2003), with a hybrid New-Keynesian Phillips curve1
πt = αyt + φπt−1 +( 1− φ)βEtπt+1 + eut, (1)
assuming serially uncorrelated shocks eut. This allows to focus on the impli-
cations of endogenous inﬂation persistence, φ,a so p p o s e dt oi n ﬂation per-
sistence arising merely due to a serially correlated external driving process.
More details and estimates of the model parameters are given in the appen-
dix.
T h ec e n t r a lb a n ki sa s s u m e dt oh a v ea na dh o cq u a d r a t i co b j e c t i v ef u n c -
tion penalizing the volatility of inﬂation around target, and the volatility of
the output gap, with a relative weight, λ







1In comparison with Smets (2003), we introduce a factor of β in front of Etπt+1in
equation 1, so that the hybrid New-Keynesian Phillips curve reduces to the standard one
as endogenous inﬂation persistence, φ, approaches zero.
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We ﬁrst discuss the implications of endogenous inﬂation persistence under
optimal discretionary policy, before discussing the gains from commitment.
The ﬁrst-order condition yields the following targeting rule, which is a rela-





(1 − βρπ)yt =0 , (4)
and the solution for inﬂation dynamics in reduced form in this model is given
by (see Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), Walsh (2003a))




where the serial correlation of inﬂation under optimal policy, ρπ, depends on
the parameters λ
y,β,φand α. Under optimal discretionary policy, the form
of the IS-curve (see equation 14 in the appendix) does not inﬂuence the serial
correlation of inﬂation or the optimal targeting rule.
The serial correlation of inﬂation under optimal discretionary policy de-
pends on the degree of endogenous inﬂation persistence, φ,a n dt h er e l a t i v e
weight on output stabilization, λ
y, as shown in Figure 1.2 We can see that
inﬂation gradually returns to equilibrium in the presence of endogenous inﬂa-
tion persistence, with ρπ lying between 0 and 1. In the presence of inﬂation
inertia, optimal policy inﬂuences the speed with which inﬂation converges
back to target following inﬂationary disturbances. We can see from Figure
1 that as the central bank puts relatively more weight on inﬂation stabili-
sation, the speed of convergence of inﬂation under optimal policy increases,
for a given degree of endogenous inﬂation persistence, since the central bank
reacts more strongly to inﬂationary disturbances when inﬂation volatility
is penalized more heavily, as can be see from equations 17 and 18 in the
appendix.
Figure 1 also shows that as endogenous inﬂation persistence increases,
for a given weight on inﬂation stabilisation, the serial correlation of inﬂation
increases, due to the greater degree of backward-lookingness in the New-
Keynesian Phillips curve. Under optimal policy for the parameter values
2Analytical solutions for the serial correlation of inﬂation are not available, and we
therefore present numerical solutions.
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and cost-push shocks in the presence of endogenous inﬂation persistence than
in its absence. When endogenous inﬂation persistence is higher, the output-
inﬂation trade-oﬀ due to cost-push shocks becomes less favourable. The
central bank needs to respond more strongly to inﬂationary disturbances,
since any such disturbances not eliminated today continue in future periods,
which might require more output contraction in future (see Clarida, Gali and
Gertler (1999)).
As in the case without endogenous inﬂation persistence, interest rates
should perfectly oﬀset demand shocks in the presence of endogenous inﬂation
persistence, since demand shocks do not introduce an output-inﬂation trade-
oﬀ.
2.2 Optimal policy under commitment
There are gains from conducting optimal monetary policy under commitment
in this hybrid New-Keynesian model (see Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999)).





[yt − (1 − φ)yt−1 − βφEtyt+1]=0 , (6)
For optimal policy under commitment, the targeting rule depends addi-
tionally on the lagged and expected future output gap, in contrast to the
discretionary targeting rule. Figure 2 shows the implications of optimal pol-
icy under commitment for the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of inﬂation.3 In the
absence of intrinsic persistence (φ =0 ), optimal policy is essentially price-
level targeting, so a positive cost-push shock causes an initial rise of inﬂation,
followed by an extended period of deﬂation. In this case, inﬂation exhibits
negative serial correlation. In contrast, if inﬂation exhibits relatively high
intrinsic persistence, then the optimal policy brings inﬂation monotonically
back towards zero, and hence inﬂation exhibits positive serial correlation. As
in the discretionary case, we can see from Figure 2 that under commitment
the speed of convergence of inﬂation increases when the central bank assigns
a relatively greater weight to inﬂation stabilisation. Moreover, as under dis-
cretion, the form of the IS-curve does not inﬂuence the serial correlation of
inﬂation or the optimal targeting rule under commitment.
3Since no analytical solutions are possible, we present numerical results.
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persistence approaches 1, the results for the serial correlation of inﬂation
under discretion and commitment approach each other.
2.3 Uncertainty about inﬂation persistence
T h ed e g r e eo fe n d o g e n o u si n ﬂation persistence is a key parameter for assess-
ing the optimality of monetary policies. For example, Levin and Williams
(2003a) show that monetary policy rules which are optimal in a forward-
looking model can yield very bad outcomes in backward-looking models, and
Rudebush (2002) shows that nominal income-targeting performs well when
inﬂation is forward-looking, but not when the degree of inﬂation inertia is
high. Given that there is little consensus about the degree of endogenous
inﬂation persistence in the empirical literature, it is of interest to consider
optimal monetary policy when the degree of inﬂation inertia is uncertain or
misspeciﬁed.
One approach of dealing with uncertainty is a Bayesian approach, in which
the policy maker has a prior distribution of the parameters, and sets policy to
minimize expected loss based on this prior distribution. Optimal monetary
policy with uncertainty about inﬂation persistence has been studied in purely
backward-looking models by Söderström (2002), who ﬁn d st h a ti tm a yb e
optimal for policy to respond more aggressively to shocks when the degree of
inﬂation persistence is uncertain than when it is certain. This is in contrast
to the classic ﬁnding by Brainard (1967), who ﬁnds for a static model that
optimal policy should be more cautious in the presence of uncertainty about
the policy multiplier. Similarly, Moessner (2005) ﬁnds within the hybrid
New-Keynesian model estimated for the euro area by Smets (2003) that it
may be optimal for policy to respond more aggressively to shocks in the
presence of uncertainty about inﬂation inertia.4
Another approach to investigating the implications of uncertainty is to
study the eﬀect of setting policy based on parameter values that are incor-
rect, but taken as certain in the central bank’s optimisation problem. This
approach is taken in the following papers. Walsh (2004) considers the New-
4Moessner (2005) ﬁnds that if the central bank cares about inﬂation and output gap
volatility, then the optimal policy response to cost-push shocks is more aggressive, while
the optimal response to demand shocks does not depend on uncertainty about inﬂation
inertia; if the central bank’s objective function only penalizes inﬂation volatility, then the
optimal policy response to shocks does not depend on uncertainty about inﬂation inertia.
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Studying speciﬁc targeting rules within this model, he ﬁnds that an ad hoc
loss function suggests that policy should be set optimally based on signiﬁ-
cantly overestimating the degree of inﬂation inertia. Angeloni, Coenen and
Smets (2003), Walsh (2003) and Coenen (2004) also ﬁnd for an ad hoc loss
function that robust monetary policy is set based on a relatively high degree
of inﬂation inertia.
3 Micro-founded models and objective func-
tions
The main motivation for introducing endogenous inﬂation persistence in
macroeconomic models is of an empirical nature. There are two main struc-
tural mechanisms, however, through which endogenous inﬂation persistence
may be generated in a micro-founded way, although there is no consensus
on the true mechanism lying behind the inﬂation inertia found empirically.
The two structural mechanisms are backward-looking price indexation and
rule-of-thumb price-setting. Depending on the structural mechanism giving
rise to inﬂation persistence, an approximation to a social welfare function
can be derived, based on the representative household’s utility, which may
be taken as the central bank’s objective function, rather than the ad hoc loss
function of equation 3 considered above.
3.1 Backward-looking indexation
One structural mechanism for generating endogenous inﬂation persistence is
partial indexation of prices to a lagged price index (see Woodford (2003)).
Each period, only a fraction of ﬁrms re-optimise their prices, while the re-
maining ﬁrms index their prices to a fraction, γ, of the lagged inﬂation rate.
Within a micro-founded model, price dispersion decreases social welfare. The
mechanism of partial indexation implies that only deviations of inﬂation from
the rate at which prices increase which are not reoptimised, γπt−1,are unde-
sirable, since only such deviations increase price dispersion. The second-order
approximation of the utility-based social welfare function therefore yields a
11
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Lt =( πt − γπt−1)





where ˜ λy depends on the structural parameters of the model, rather than
being exogenous as in the case of an ad hoc loss function. The appearance
of (πt − γπt−1)2 in the structural loss function, rather than of πt
2 as in
the ad hoc loss function considered above, aﬀects optimal monetary policy,
and its dependence on endogenous inﬂation persistence. Within the partial
indexation model, the New-Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) also depends
on the quasi-diﬀerence in inﬂation, πt − γπt−1,
πt − γπt−1 = α˜ yt + βEt(πt+1 − γπt). (8)
Since the quasi-diﬀerence of inﬂation enters in both the structural loss func-
tion and the NKPC, the value of the social loss is independent of the degree
of partial indexation, γ, in contrast to the case of an ad hoc loss function,
where the loss increases as inﬂation inertia increases (see Walsh (2004)).
However, the equilibrium dynamics of inﬂation in the case of a structural
loss function depends on γ. As shown in Woodford (2003), inﬂation returns
to equilibrium following a cost-push shock more slowly under optimal policy
when the degree of indexation is higher, both under discretion and com-
mitment, due to the partial indexation to lagged inﬂation; πt is persistent,
while πt − γπt−1 is not persistent.6 For optimal policy under commitment
with a structural loss function, it is optimal for policy to generate a period
of below-average inﬂa t i o ni nr e s p o n s et oa ni n ﬂationary cost-push shock, as
long as indexation is only partial (γ<1), following a period of above-average
inﬂation, whose length depends on the degree of indexation (see Woodford
(2003)). Such an undershooting of inﬂation is optimal, since it is incorpo-
rated into private agents’ inﬂation expectations in the period of the shock,
so that actual inﬂation is lower in the period of the shock. By contrast, no
such undershooting of inﬂation occurs for optimal policy under discretion,
since under discretionary policy the central bank is not able to manipulate
private-sector expectations. In the case of full indexation (γ =1 ), inﬂation
stays permanently higher following a cost-push shock in the case of discre-
tionary policy. Moreover, the price level increases permanently in the case
5The loss function depends on the variability of deviations, ˜ yt, of output from the
eﬃcient level of output, rather than on deviations from the natural level of output.
6See Figures 7.4 and 7.5 in Woodford (2003) for details.
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(see Woodford (2003)).
Within the model of backward-looking indexation, speciﬁct a r g e t i n gr u l e s 7
for optimal policy from a timeless perspective8 can be derived, which can il-
lustrate the implications of using a structural loss function compared with
an ad hoc loss function (see Walsh (2004)). In the case of a structural loss
function, the targeting rule has the form9




(˜ yt − ˜ yt−1). (9)
The targeting rule speciﬁes an appropriate near-term inﬂation rate, which
depends on the projected change in the output gap, as well as on the lagged
inﬂation rate for γ>1, since the central bank minimises the variability of
the quasi-diﬀerence in inﬂation, (πt − γπt−1)2 (see Woodford (2003)). The
targeting rule depends additionally on structural model parameters via ˜ λ
y
.









Et(˜ yt+1 − ˜ yt), (10)
d o e sn o td e p e n do nl a g g e di n ﬂation, but is forward-looking instead, depend-
ing on the expected future output gap, since current inﬂation aﬀects future
inﬂation in the presence of inﬂation inertia, and the central bank penalizes
inﬂation volatility (see Walsh (2004)).10
3.2 Uncertainty about the degree of indexation
As shown by Levin and Williams (2003b), using a structural objective func-
tion for the central bank can alter the results for optimal monetary policy
7Speciﬁc targeting rules are relationships between endogenous variables, to which a
central bank is assumed to be able to commit (see Svensson and Woodford (2003)). It is
assumed that such a targeting rule can be implemented by setting nominal interest rates
appropriately, ignoring the issue of how this is achieved.
8Optimal policy from a timeless perspective has been deﬁned by Woodford (1999) as
a time-invariant policy which a central bank would always wish to have been expected to
follow.
9Note that this rule is also robustly optimal in the sense of Giannoni and Woodford
(2002), in that it does not depend on the properties of shocks hitting the economy.
10This assumes that the output gap ˜ yt appears in the standard loss function.
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tion, so that it is also of interest to consider structural objective functions
with uncertainty about inﬂation persistence. Using a Bayesian approach, op-
timal monetary policy under commitment in the presence of parameter un-
certainty about the degree of indexation is studied in Kimura and Kurozumi
(2003). They study optimal policy using a micro-founded loss function11
within the model with backward-looking indexation of Giannoni and Wood-
ford (2003). They ﬁnd that policy should respond more aggressively to shocks
to the natural real interest rate when uncertainty about the degree of inﬂation
inertia is higher.
Walsh (2004) considers optimal policy for a micro-founded loss function
when the degree of indexation is misspeciﬁed, within the New-Keynesian
model with partial indexation of Benigno and Woodford (2004). Studying
speciﬁct a r g e t i n gr u l e sw i t h i nt h i sm o d e l ,h eﬁnds that a structural loss
function suggests that policy should be set optimally assuming a moderate
value of inﬂation inertia (but one that is still larger than the true value), in
contrast to the result found for an ad hoc loss function, which suggested that
optimal policy should be set based on signiﬁcantly overestimating the degree
of inﬂation inertia, as discussed in Section 2.3. This result is due to the
fact that inﬂation inertia is less costly using a structural loss function, which
penalizes volatility in the quasi-diﬀerence in inﬂation; by contrast, the loss
increases as inﬂation inertia increases using an ad hoc loss function, which
penalizes inﬂation volatility.
3.3 Rule-of-thumb price-setting
An alternative structural mechanism for generating endogenous inﬂation
persistence is an extension of the Calvo pricing model to include a frac-
tion of backward-looking rule-of-thumb price-setters, as proposed by Gali
and Gertler (1999); the remaining ﬁrms set prices optimally. Amato and
Laubach (2003) and Steinsson (2003) derive a second-order approximation
to the micro-founded loss function with rule-of-thumb price-setting. In the
model of Amato and Laubach (2003), backward-looking ﬁrms follow a rule-
o f - t h u m bb a s e do nt h ea v e r a g ep r i c es e ti nt h el a s tp e r i o da n dt h el a g g e d
11Note that Kimura and Kurozumi (2003) include a term penalizing interest rate volatil-
ity in the central bank’s objective function, motivated by considerations other than the
structural mechanism giving rise to inﬂation persistence, such as a desire of avoiding the
zero bound on nominal interest rates.
14
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where yt is the diﬀerence between output and the ﬂexible-price level of output,
and the relative weights depend on the structural parameters of the model.
Steinsson (2003) considers a more general rule-of-thumb, where backward-
looking ﬁrms also take account of last period’s demand condition, in addition
to last period’s average price and inﬂation rate. This leads to the presence
of two additional terms involving the output gap in the micro-founded loss
function, compared with equation 11,
L = π
2










∆πy(πt − πt−1)yt−1, (12)
with relative weights again depending on the structural model parameters.
Similar to Woodford (2003)’s ﬁnding of a dependence of the structural loss
function on the quasi-diﬀerence (πt − γπt−1)2, the structural loss functions
for rule-of-thumb price-setting models depend on variations in changes in
inﬂation, (πt − πt−1)2, rather than just on inﬂation volatility, but with a
diﬀerent functional form.
One notable feature of the structural objective function of equation 12
derived within this rule-of-thumb price-setting mechanism is a low weight
placed on output stabilisation in the structural objective function (see Steins-
son (2003)). Consequently, output is stabilised much less, inﬂation is lower
in the period of the shock, and inﬂation is less persistent for a structural
than for an ad hoc loss function (with λ
y =0 .5), both under commitment
and discretion.
Steinsson (2003) ﬁnds that in response to cost-push shocks, inﬂation re-
turns more slowly to equilibrium for optimal policy with inﬂation inertia
than in its absence, both under discretion and commitment. As in models
with partial indexation, it is optimal for policy under commitment with a
structural loss function to generate a period of below-average inﬂation in re-
sponse to an inﬂationary cost-push shock, as long as there is some degree of
forward-lookingness in the NKPC (see Steinsson (2003)).
15
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price-setters
Optimal monetary policy under commitment in the presence of parame-
ter uncertainty about the fraction of rule-of-thumb price-setters is studied
in Kimura and Kurozumi (2003), considering micro-founded loss functions
within models based on Amato and Laubach (2003) and of Steinsson (2003).
For both models of rule-of-thumb price-setting they ﬁnd that policy should
respond more aggressively to shocks to the natural real interest rate when
uncertainty about the fraction of rule-of-thumb price-setters is higher. This
ﬁnding is in line with their result in the case of uncertainty about the degree
of indexation discussed in Section 3.2.
4R o l e o f w a g e - s e t t i n g
4.1 Micro-founded objective functions
Considering a Calvo-type model with nominal rigidities in both price- and
wage-setting, as well as with partial backward-looking indexation of prices
and wages, Levin et al. (2005) ﬁnd that a policy rule where changes in the
nominal interest rate react to wage inﬂation performs nearly as well in terms
of social welfare as the fully optimal rule under commitment. By contrast,
they ﬁnd that an estimated monetary policy rule which does not target wage
inﬂation performs much worse in terms of social welfare than a policy rule
reacting to wage inﬂation. However, for an ad-hoc objective function, instead
of a micro-founded one, Levin et al. (2005) ﬁnd that the estimated monetary
policy rule which does not target wage inﬂation no longer performs much
worse than a policy rule reacting to wage inﬂation. This result shows that
wage dispersion due to nominal wage rigidity is responsible for large social
welfare costs. Within their model, the micro-founded loss function can be




2 + ˆ λ
w
(wt − wt−1 + πt − γwπt−1)
2, (13)
in addition to more complicated terms due to ﬂuctuations in consumption
(see Onatski and Williams (2004)). Here, wt is the real wage, γ is the degree
of price-indexation, and γw is the degree of wage-indexation. Variations in
wage inﬂation are costly in terms of social welfare due to the dispersion of
16
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derson and Levin (2000)’s ﬁndings within a Calvo-type model with nominal
price and wage rigidity, but without partial backward-looking price- or wage-
indexation, where the micro-founded objective function can be expressed in
terms of the variances of the output gap, price- and wage-inﬂation. Conse-
quently, there exists a trade-oﬀ between stabilisation of the output gap, price-
and wage-inﬂation. Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) ﬁnd that a simple
hybrid policy rule targeting wage-inﬂation in addition to price-inﬂation per-
forms nearly as well in terms of social welfare as the fully optimal policy
under commitment. By contrast, a policy rule targeting price-inﬂation does
not perform well in terms of social welfare, due to excessive variation in nom-
inal wage-inﬂation and the output gap, since all adjustment in real wages has
t oo c c u rv i ac h a n g e si nn o m i n a lw a g e s ,w h i c hi nt u r nr e q u i r ev a r i a t i o ni nt h e
output gap.
Levin et al. (2005) also consider a model with nominal rigidities in both
price- and wage-setting, as well as with partial backward-looking indexation
of prices and wages, using Taylor-contracts instead of Calvo’s approach. Us-
ing this alternative model of wage-setting, they ﬁnd that a policy rule where
changes in the nominal interest rate react to wage inﬂation no longer performs
better in terms of social welfare than an estimated rule not reacting to wage
inﬂation. This happens since for Taylor-contracts wage dispersion is much
smaller than within the Calvo model, so that wage inﬂation is no longer the
dominant component of social welfare. This shows that results for monetary
policy design based on structural loss functions can be aﬀected by the type of
wage-setting behaviour, ie Taylor contracts versus Calvo wage-setting. One
might also expect that optimal monetary policy based on structural loss func-
tions may be aﬀected by the type of pricing behaviour, for example the use
of Taylor contracts versus Calvo price-setting.
4.2 Uncertainty about the degree of price- and wage-
indexation
Levin et al. (2005) estimate their model using Bayesian techniques. Quan-
tifying the degree of parameter uncertainty via the width of the estimated
Bayesian posterior probability distribution for each parameter, they ﬁnd that
sampling uncertainty about parameters describing the degree of price- and
wage-indexation imply only modest costs in terms of social welfare. However,
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than implied by the estimation, they ﬁnd that knowledge of the degree of
price-indexation could lead to a large gain in welfare.
5 Other issues
5.1 Heterogeneity in inﬂation persistence
Within a monetary union such as the euro area, the implications for optimal
policy of possible heterogeneity in the degree of inﬂation inertia among diﬀer-
ent members of the monetary union is of interest. Benigno and Lopez-Salido
(2002) analyse diﬀerent inﬂation targeting policies in the presence of het-
erogeneity in inﬂation persistence among diﬀerent regions in the euro area.
They employ a micro-founded New-Keynesian model of a currency area, and
rank the diﬀerent inﬂation targeting policies using the social welfare func-
tion based on the representative household’s utility. They ﬁnd that targeting
euro-area-wide HICP is not optimal. Instead, it is optimal for the central
bank to assign a greater weight to inﬂation volatility in the region with a
greater degree of inﬂation inertia. In earlier related work, Aoki (2001) found
within a two-sector model (a ﬂexible-price and a sticky-price sector), but
without inﬂation inertia, that it is optimal for policy to target the inﬂation
rate in the sticky-price sector, rather than to target aggregate inﬂation.
5.2 Imperfect information
Imperfect knowledge may also aﬀect optimal policy in models with inﬂation
inertia. Orphanides and Williams (2002) study a model with inﬂation in-
ertia where economic agents have imperfect knowledge about the dynamic
structure of the economy and the relative weight placed on output gap sta-
bilisation in the central bank’s objective function. Private agents are as-
sumed to rely on adaptive learning to continually form expectations and
update their beliefs about the structure of the economy. With such ‘per-
petual learning’, Orphanides and Williams (2002) show that policy should
respond more aggressively to inﬂation under imperfect knowledge than under
perfect knowledge. They also show that inﬂation persistence may increase if
the central bank places a large weight on output gap stabilisation. Moreover,
Gaspar, Smets and Vestin (2005) show that with imperfect knowledge and
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learning, there is a clear relationship between the monetary policy regime
and the probability distribution of a time-varying inﬂation persistence para-
meter. They ﬁnd that a more credible policy with a greater weight assigned
to price stability leads to a reduction in inﬂation persistence. Moreover, they
ﬁnd an asymmetry in the central bank’s response to shocks, with the ability
of the central bank to inﬂuence private sector expectations via the learning
mechanism contributing additionally to a more aggressive response to shocks
when inﬂation persistence is higher.
6S u m m a r y
This paper provided an overview of the implications of inﬂation persistence
for the design of monetary policy, since it is an important question how mon-
etary policy should be set optimally when the structure of the economy ex-
hibits inﬂation persistence. We reviewed results for models with both ad-hoc
objective functions, and in micro-founded models with micro-founded ob-
jective functions, considering partial backward-looking indexation and rule-
of-thumb price-setting as the mechanisms underlying inﬂation inertia. We
also reviewed the implications of uncertainty about inﬂation persistence for
monetary policy design, the role of wage-setting, and the implications of
heterogeneity in inﬂation persistence and of imperfect knowledge.
Appendix
Section 2 illustrates results for inﬂation dynamics under optimal policy within
a hybrid New-Keynesian model for the euro area. The IS-curve of this model
is given by
yt = −σ(it − Etπt+1)+θyt−1 +( 1− θ)Etyt+1 + egt. (14)
Table 1 presents estimates of the model parameters for the euro area of
Smets (2003), where φ is the degree of endogenous inﬂation peristence, θ is
the degree of endogenous output peristence, β is the discount factor, α is the
slope of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve, and σ is the interest elasticity of
demand. The shocks in equations 1 and 14,
eut+1 = ρueut + ηut+1,e gt+1 = ρgegt + ηgt+1, (15)
19
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 539
November 2005are assumed to be serially uncorrelated, i.e. ρu = ρg =0 .






Given a solution for the serial correlation of inﬂation, the optimal discre-
tionary policy rule in this model can be expressed as (see Clarida, Gali and
Gertler (1999))




























While the serial correlation of inﬂation does not depend on the parameters
of the IS-curve, the optimal discretionary policy rule depends on them.
12Note the extra factor of (1 − θ) multiplying the serial correlation of inﬂation, ρπ in
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Figure 1: Serial correlation in inﬂation for optimal discretionary policy, ρπ,
as a function of endogenous inﬂation persistence, φ,a n dt h er e l a t i v ew e i g h t
on output in the central bank’s loss function, λ
y,w i t h i na ne s t i m a t e dm o d e l
for the euro area.
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Figure 2: Serial correlation in inﬂation for optimal policy under commitment,
ρπ, as a function of endogenous inﬂation persistence, φ,a n dt h er e l a t i v e
weight on output in the central bank’s loss function, λ
y,w i t h i na ne s t i m a t e d
model for the euro area.
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